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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. No. 2-08-cr-00697-002) 
District Judge:  Hon. Joel H. Slomsky 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on November 5, 2010 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, RENDELL and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 8, 2010) 
   
 
O P I N I O N 
    
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 William Florence appeals an October 21, 2009, judgment of sentence of the 
District Court.  He contends that the District Court plainly erred by imposing a special 
condition of supervised release that prohibits him from incurring any new credit charges 
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or opening additional lines of credit without the approval of a probation officer.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm the sentence the District Court imposed. 
I.  Background 
 Law enforcement agents arrested Florence on October 23, 2008, after observing 
him delivering phencyclidine (PCP) to Terrence Savage.  The agents later made three 
controlled-drug purchases from Savage through a confidential informant.  In each 
instance, Florence served as Savage’s supplier.  When Florence was arrested, he had an 
additional quantity of PCP on him and roughly $2,700 of “buy-money” that the informant 
had given Savage moments beforehand.  The total amount of PCP involved in Florence 
and Savage’s transactions was 614.03 grams 
 Florence moved to suppress the evidence seized from him when he was arrested.  
At the suppression hearing, Florence falsely testified that he was not involved in drug 
transactions with his co-defendant, Savage, on the date in question.  The District Court 
denied the motion to suppress and Florence subsequently pled guilty to one count of 
conspiracy to distribute 100 grams or more of PCP, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 
841(b)(1)(B); one count of distribution of 100 grams or more of PCP, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); two counts of aiding and abetting the distribution of 100 
grams or more of PCP, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 
2;  and one count of possession with intent to distribute PCP, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C).  (Appellant’s App. at 3-4.)  
 At the sentencing hearing on October 21, 2009, the District Court carefully 
considered the factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in determining the appropriate 
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sentence to impose. In discussing Florence’s criminal conduct, the District Court 
evaluated Florence’s drug revenue, which, from the transactions in the record, the District 
Court calculated to be approximately $8,000 over a one-month period.  Florence also 
presented, and the court addressed, Florence’s legal sources of income. At a number of 
points during the hearing, the District Court expressed its concern regarding Florence’s 
lack of truthfulness, as it was clear that Florence had lied in his testimony to the court 
during the suppression hearing.     
The District Court imposed a sentence of seventy-five months’ imprisonment, a 
term within the Sentencing Guidelines range that the District Court had calculated.  The 
District Court also imposed a five-year term of supervised release, a special assessment 
of $500, and a number of special conditions of supervised release.  Among the special 
conditions, the District Court required Florence to provide the U.S. Probation Office with 
full disclosure of his financial records, including truthful monthly statements of his 
income and yearly tax returns.  The District Court also directed Florence “not to incur 
any new credit charges or open any additional lines of credit without the approval of the 
Probation Officer.” The court, however, did not impose a fine or restitution, beyond the 
special assessment.  Florence did not object to these terms.   
Florence appealed. 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
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 We generally review a district court’s imposition of sentence, including conditions 
of supervised release, for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 
143 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007).  If the sentence was imposed without objection, we review for 
plain error.  Voelker, 489 F.3d at 143 n.1.    
III.  Discussion 
 Florence challenges only the District Court’s imposition of the special condition of 
supervised release, prohibiting him from incurring new credit charges or opening new 
lines of credit without the approval of the probation office. 
“Though district courts have broad discretion in fashioning special conditions of 
supervised release, this discretion is not unfettered,” and must be exercised according to 
18 U.S.C. § 3583.  United States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 405 (3d Cir. 2010).  Section 
3583(d) requires, inter alia, that any such condition of supervised release:  (1) “must be 
‘reasonably related’ to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” and (2) “must impose 
‘no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary’ to deter future criminal 
conduct, protect the public, and rehabilitate the defendant.”  Voelker, 489 F.3d at 144 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)).  Although we “‘have consistently required district courts 
to set forth factual findings to justify special probation conditions,’” id. at 144 (quoting 
United States v. Warren, 186 F.3d 358, 366 (3d Cir. 1999)), “we may affirm the 
condition if we can ascertain any viable basis for the . . . restriction in the record before 
the District Court,” United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 184 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotations omitted).   
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 Florence argues that his drug offenses are unrelated to any fraud or financial 
impropriety and therefore cannot support the financial restrictions the District Court 
imposed.  Florence refers to Section 5D1.3(d)(2) of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual, which recommends the imposition of the instant special condition 
with a limitation that the condition only apply if a defendant fails to pay on time any fine 
or restitution.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(d)(2) (2008).  Noting 
that the limitation present in 5D1.3(d)(2) is absent here and that no restitution or fine has 
been imposed, Florence asserts that, at a minimum, the lack of explanation for this 
special condition requires us to remand this case to the District Court.  
 On the record before us, we conclude that the District Court did not commit plain 
error in imposing the special condition preventing Florence from incurring new credit 
charges or opening additional lines of credit without approval of a probation officer.  This 
condition serves as a strong deterrent and monitoring tool, particularly since Florence’s 
drug transactions are inextricably linked to his finances and since he is of dubious 
credibility.1   Thus, there is a viable basis for the condition in the record.  See Miller, 594 
F.3d at 184.  Moreover, even if the imposition of this special condition was error, it was 
not plain error.2
                                                          
 1 A better explanation by the District Court for the special condition would have 
facilitated our review of this ground for appeal. 
 
       
2 Florence’s attempts to analogize his special condition to those in Pruden and 
Evans are unavailing.  See United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1998).  In Pruden, a special condition 
requiring defendant’s participation in a mental health treatment program constituted plain 
error because there was no evidence that defendant had any mental health issues, and in 
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IV.  Conclusion 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
turn, no need for such treatment.  See 398 F.3d at 249.  In Evans, a condition requiring 
reimbursement of counsel fees was “not related in any tangible way to [defendant’s] 
insurance fraud,” and amounted to plain error.  See 155 F.3d at 249. 
 
